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Book Reviews
Ethics and War
Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory
By James M. Dubik
Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies, US
Army War College

L

ieutenant General (Ret.) James Dubik has written a little book with
big ideas. After an extraordinary military career, he served as the
Omar N. Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at the US Army War
College, completed a PhD in philosophy, and is now Professor of
Practice in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University.
Just War Reconsidered is an ambitious and provocative book. Dubik
conducts a critical analysis of two contemporary models of civil-military
relations—Peter D. Feaver’s “Principal-Agent” model presented in
Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (2003) and
Eliot A. Cohen’s “Unequal Dialogue” illustrated in Supreme Command:
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (2002)—against the moral
framework proposed by Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (1977).
Military professionals are well acquainted with the Just War terms of
jus ad bellum (just cause for war) and jus in bello (just conduct in war).
The latter is more salient for them vis-à-vis the use of military force
against combatants and noncombatants with the prevalence of rules of
engagement for military operations during the ongoing war on terror.
Arguably, such rules for fighting wars are clearer and simpler under the
model of state-on-state conflict, and they get fuzzier with civil wars
and insurgencies. This is especially so against nonstate actors as with
the twenty-first-century’s global experience with violent extremist
organizations.
Early in the book, Dubik introduces the expression “citizens-whobecome soldiers” to reinforce the link between a government that has a
moral obligation to protect and defend its citizens, who in turn become
agents of the state in the protection of national security interests. Given
that soldiers have moral value and are simultaneously citizens, their
activity, effort, and lives, when sacrificed, should be used well.
Dubik identifies an important gap in Walzer’s Just War theory in
that it fails to address the moral obligations of political and military
leaders in waging war. Ostensibly, senior national leaders guide and
direct war-waging strategy, resourcing, and decisions for how war is
conducted. Perhaps, most important is the leader’s responsibility to
sustain the will of the people—here Dubik completes his allusion to
the Clausewitzian trinity. War-waging decisions by political leaders are
necessarily in collaboration and coordination with leaders of the military
profession. Civil-military relations are thus an integral component of the
decision-making processes for Just War deliberations and actions.
Dubik sets the stage appropriately with Samuel Huntington’s Soldier
and the State (1957) and the precept of objective civilian control for the
military profession. Noticeably absent is the mention of Morris Janowitz,
the author of military sociology. This reviewer finds it difficult to discuss
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civil-military relations and the military profession without addressing
the precepts of The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960).
Janowitz would support military leaders having the agency to influence
and shape policy—as Dubik contends is necessary—because the stakes
of getting it wrong are so high. Dubik asserts, convincingly, that moral
responsibility does not give anyone “the right to be wrong” in waging
war. Accordingly, insistence on that authority and failure to establish the
conditions (leader climate or organizational/institutional culture) that
increase the chances for success are morally bankrupt actions of civilian
and military leaders, who have “an obligation to be as right as possible
before they make a decision” (93).
Dubik uses three primary cases to test Walzer’s framework for jus in
bello: the American Civil War, the Second World War, and the combined
case of Afghanistan and Iraq. For the ideal war waged rightly, he notes
civilian and military leaders had “several months of active analysis,
intense and sometimes acrimonious debate, aboveboard and behindthe-scenes maneuvering, contentious analysis, and final argument” (16).
In completing his analysis of less-than-ideal war, Dubik cites cases
of broken dialogue “when participants, whether civilian or military are
dismissive of the perspectives of others, the dialogue breaks down and is
quickly replaced with a facsimile or worse—no dialogue at all” (119). He
concludes: “There is no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military warwaging responsibilities” (123) and derives the following five principles
for ethical war-waging for national security professionals:
1. Continuous dialogue with senior civilian and military leaders (devise
strategy and plans; understand, acknowledge, and address risk)
2. Final Decision Authority with the political-strategic leader in
accordance with governing documents (for the United States, the
Constitution)
3. Managerial competence in performing enterprise-level functions (US
Title 10) that enable the operational force in the conduct of mission
across the spectrum of conflict
4. Legitimacy established and maintained with the governed populace
5. Resignation as a form of dissent (moral agency for senior military
leaders)
While Dubik provides a framework and set of principles for national
leaders, his epilogue presents two sections with important questions by
which to judge the conduct of war as ethical and moral. It really comes
down to who is to blame and who is responsible for wars waged badly.
To judge, Dubik asks simply “is the war being dragged out unnecessarily owing to a refusal to allocate sufficient resources—forces, funds,
or strategic attention” (175). The reader is left to conclude that while
senior military leaders may be complicit, it is the civilian leaders who are
ultimately responsible for waging wars justly.
Just War Reconsidered offers a compelling challenge to the existing
civil-military debate. When does a military leader’s provision of “best
military advice” to inform the development of policy objectives and
thereby shape strategy cross the line from influence to insistence? At
what point does the option of military resignation threaten civilian
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leaders and have an adverse impact on civil-military relations? These
questions remain unanswered, but the military profession must have
this conversation.

Fighting Hurt: Rule and Exception in Torture and War
By Henry Shue
Reviewed by David Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics, Davidson College,
and author of Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and
Interrogation

P

hilosophers are often accused of living in “ivory towers,” preferring
to ruminate about arid abstractions rather than the stuff of everyday
human existence. Thankfully, Henry Shue is not that kind of philosopher.
Even though he has studied and taught at several top-notch universities,
including Princeton, Cornell, and Oxford, his whole scholarly career has
been devoted to examining practical ethical and political issues. Fighting
Hurt gathers 22 essays published over a 40-year period on topics such as
preemptive and preventive war, humanitarian military intervention, jus
ad bellum and jus in bello proportionality, torture, and whether a country
facing a “supreme emergency” may justifiably target enemy civilians.
Shue is steeped in the laws of armed conflict and international
humanitarian law. Many of the arguments in the book reflect his efforts
to interpret treaty law in connection with US strategy and military doctrine, as well as to urge reforms of international legal norms where he
finds them wanting. Most chapters will be of interest to Department of
Defense lawyers and doctrine writers. A few chapters will be accessible
primarily to Just War theorists who have followed recent lines of dense
philosophical debate, for example, on whether soldiers fighting for an
unjust cause forfeit some rights that opposing combatants retain. While
most readers will not study the complete anthology, all strategic leaders
will benefit from reading Shue’s careful analyses.
Given that a current presidential candidate has endorsed waterboarding and “worse” interrogation tactics, and threatened to order US
government personnel to employ them even if they are illegal, it would
be prudent for military and intelligence leaders to reflect on one or more
of Shue’s chapters on torture. For decades, Shue has argued against
government-sanctioned torture, criticizing the standard “ticking bomb”
hypothetical scenario as artificial and unrealistic and condemning
attempts by judges and government lawyers to dilute the clear meaning
of US-ratified treaties that ban torture under all circumstances. Although
I have taken issue with a couple of Shue’s stances in my book Partly
Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation (Rowman
& Littlefield, 2009, 2016), his arguments against legalizing torture, even
against suspected terrorists, are powerful and well worth considering.
Some of Shue’s most interesting work (exhibited in several chapters)
has focused on issues surrounding the targeting of “dual-use” infrastructure in war, for example, in some of the bombing tactics employed
against Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999. “If radar and missiles designed
to bring down attacking aircraft cannot function without electricity,
electricity-generating plants then serve a vital military role. But operating
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rooms in hospitals and water-purification plants also do not function
without electricity, and they are both central for civilian life” (280). Shue
is critical both of relevant laws of war and US-NATO bombing tactics
he believes have been too permissive in such cases. He argues instead
that a more restrictive rule would be more ethical, both in light of the
jus in bello principle of noncombatant immunity and in the interest of
minimizing gratuitous harms to civilians. “A facility that is . . . dualpurpose, but makes an irreplaceable contribution to vital civilian needs,
should be treated as if it were entirely civilian,” hence, not a legitimate
target of military attack (282).
Shue deserves credit for the care he has taken to specify what we
ought to mean by ad bellum and in bello principles of proportionality, and
how we should weigh force protection against avoiding harm to noncombatants in military deliberations about war strategies, tactics, and
weaponeering. Finally, Shue constructs compelling arguments for morally
justifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for humanitarian
military intervention and preventive war.
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Technology and War
The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and
Drones–Confronting a New Age of Threat
By Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum
Reviewed by John C. Becking, US Army

T

he Future of Violence is an excellent exploration of technology’s
impact on modern security concepts. The authors show how technology has altered the world, such that governments are no longer the
sole guarantors of security. Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum describe
technologies seemingly plucked from Hollywood science-fiction movies:
insect-sized drones controlled by smartphones from half a world away
that are used to deliver DNA-matched lethal doses of poison; home
chemists using publicly available information to create a virus resistant
to vaccination which could be dispensed by air to a packed stadium
of people; and cyberattacks assuming control of a user’s computer to
execute nefarious activities around the world. Published in 2015, the
authors concede these technologies will soon show their age or become
irrelevant (citing Moore’s Law that computing “power” doubles every
two years). Such technological advances, however, showcase the arc of
technological capabilities.
Wittes and Blum argue technological advancements have created an
environment of distributed offensive capabilities where new technologies allow groups or individuals to conduct offensive actions previously
reserved for states. Offensive action, for example, no longer requires
an aircraft carrier or the latest stealth fighter. Instead, action could be
conducted by an individual via a cyberattack, and achieve the same levels
of destruction. They further describe how technological advances have
simultaneously created distributed vulnerabilities where increased use
and reliance upon technology mean all states, groups, and individuals
are vulnerable to attack, corruption, or theft. The authors call this new
reality many-to-many threats and spend considerable time describing the
political, legal, and moral implications of facing many-to-many threats
as opposed to the traditional peer-to-peer threat that characterized the
Cold War.
Another intriguing discussion regards the balance of liberty and
security. Challenging the common conception that decreasing liberty
and privacy is a natural cost to increasing security, Wittes and Blum
suggest the most-free societies (Australia, Scandinavian countries, and
the United States) are not necessarily the least safe, while the least-free
countries (North Korea, Somalia, and Uzbekistan) are not likely to make
a visitor feel safe. Rather, they argue the liberty and security balance is
more nuanced in a technologically advanced age and is most reflected in
terms of privacy.
Modern technology makes total privacy unobtainable as states and
corporations gather megadata about individuals and organizations alike.
Wittes and Blum suggest the modern perception of privacy is based
on the intent for data collection and the nature of the data collected.
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A corporation using individual data (to target marketing, for instance)
would be considered acceptable while a government using the identical
data would be considered unacceptable and a grave infringement upon
privacy. They believe this privacy nuance parallels the liberty and
security balance.
Throughout the book, the authors describe technologies and threats
in relation to central governments, which they term “Leviathans.” These
Leviathans still have a significant place in world security, but are seen
as exercising shared rather than sole responsibility for societal security.
Wittes and Blum highlight the careful balance between the responsibility of the state to secure society with the responsibility of private
organizations/citizens to contribute to security. They cite, for example,
the hacker group Anonymous’ attacks against ISIL: Anonymous did
not act in concert with the international community, but the intended
effects were complementary. The authors strongly suggest international
governance (treaty organizations like NATO as well as bilateral
agreements) will be important to the ability of Leviathans to provide
security in the face of technological advances. Overall, a combination of
individual, private, and government measures will be required to ensure
societal security.
Wittes and Blum spend little time discussing specific policies
governments and societies should adopt to deal with the new security
realities. With the majority of the book so well developed, this reviewer
wishes they had devoted more attention to plotting the way forward for
ensuring security.
The Future of Violence is an excellent resource for anyone in the
security or national policy fields desiring to understand how technology is changing our conception of security. This book will force us to
reconsider how technology alters concepts of security.

The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest
for Aerospace Security
By Nicholas Michael Sambaluk
Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College
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I

n his book, The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace
Security, Nicholas Sambaluk precisely recounts the Cold War dilemmas
confronting presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy.
While the Cold War was largely an era of US economic prosperity and
peace, political and military tensions and competition drove policy
decisions in regards to strategic deterrence, ballistic missile research, and
the space race. Accordingly, both presidents were compelled to adjust
these policies, mainly due to unsubstantiated fears among Americans,
interservice rivalries, and astute Soviet propaganda.
As Sambaluk accurately relates, Eisenhower used the National
Security Council (NSC) mechanism to formulate long-term policy
and strategy. In accordance with his Basic National Security Policy,
The New Look, Eisenhower devoted several NSC meetings, as well as
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commissioning several committees, to study the inclusion of ballistic
missiles in the US nuclear deterrence. This effort paid substantial dividends, resulting in the establishment of the US nuclear triad by the end
of the decade. Of significance, the central role of nuclear deterrence
resulted in a strong US national security posture without injury to the
economy and societal moral fortitude.
While Eisenhower’s leadership and managerial style steadfastly
guided the nation through a dangerous period in the Cold War, it did
so at the cost of his presidential power. Eisenhower, the war hero and
political outsider, fostered an image of quiet optimism, confidence,
and nonpartisanship in the executive office. Few dared to challenge
his mastery of national security issues during his first term; however,
whereas Eisenhower was an incredibly active and engaged president in
the development of policy and strategy, his “hidden hand” management
style gave the general impression of inactivity, detachment, and complacency regarding Soviet ambitions.
Even though critics continually assailed the administration with
perceived gaps—bomber, nuclear, and economic among others—
Eisenhower was able to stave off these assertions, primarily due to
public confidence in his leadership. With the Soviet launch of Sputnik in
October 1957, however, this trust began to unravel. Critics now spoke of
a missile gap and a space gap, creating near hysteria among the American
people of an imminent nuclear holocaust. In reality, all the purported
gaps favored the United States, but partisan politics and interservice
rivalries stoked fears to fever pitch.
Aside from the Democratic Party using the missile gap for the midterm and presidential elections, the US Air Force sought to monopolize
aerospace (both the air and space mediums), ultimately with nuclear
armed bombers orbiting the planet (i.e., the Dyna-Soar program).
Eisenhower persistently fought Air Force efforts to weaponize space,
wishing to reserve this realm for peaceful purposes and to keep the
space program under civilian control (i.e., NASA). Though the president
was primarily interested in reconnaissance satellites to monitor Soviet
intercontinental missile and bomber bases, he did see the scientific
benefits of space initiatives—as long as the programs were financially
prudent and served a practical purpose.
For his part in the space race, Kennedy used the myth of the missile
gap to ascend to the presidency. Shortly after the inauguration, however,
he backed off when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara inadvertently
exposed the myth of the missile gap. Still, senior Air Force officers
regarded Kennedy as an aerospace ally in view of his campaign promises and his invocation of the New Frontier. The quintessence of youth,
energy, intelligence, and charm, Kennedy showed promise as an Air
Force advocate.
Nevertheless, Kennedy, like Eisenhower, wanted to reserve space
for peaceful means, though he did relish the competitive aspects of the
space race. Furthermore, he ensured NASA remained in control of the
space program. As a reflection of his ambiguous space policy though, he
chose to support both the space program and the Dyna-Soar program.
Where Kennedy differed from Eisenhower was in the realm of national
prestige. Whereas Eisenhower saw no practical purpose in a lunar
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landing, Kennedy viewed it as a demonstration of US technological and
scientific superiority over the Soviets. Ironically, other than for prestige,
Kennedy had no real interest in space. Hence, Kennedy provided no
vision for the future of space exploration—that would be left to subsequent administrations. Moreover, despite the hype and propaganda, the
Air Force Dyna-Soar program could never overcome the technological
(and political) hurdles to fulfill program objectives. This program, too,
would become moribund before the end of the decade, ending Air Force
aspirations for space.
Sambaluk’s well-researched and well-written book captures the
zeitgeist of the Cold War. Accordingly, Sambaluk addresses obscure
issues surrounding the missile age. Hence, students of the Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations will find The Other Space Race not only
revealing, but also a fine addition to their library.
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Biographies
Alter Egos: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and the Twilight
Struggle over American Power
By Mark Landler
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, a recently retired research professor from the
US Army War College

M

ark Landler’s Alter Egos examines the political and working relationship between President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, when
she was Obama’s Secretary of State. Landler states Obama and Clinton
share a similar foreign policy outlook, but have very different views—
based on their upbringings, experiences, and political worldviews—on
the use of the military as an instrument of power.
According to Landler, Obama’s childhood in Indonesia and Hawaii,
exposed him to a variety of opinions on the nature of US foreign policy,
including the belief US leaders could bungle into conflicts they did
not understand, thereby doing more harm than good. Obama came to
believe many Americans habitually overestimated their country’s ability
to shape events in distant countries, and as a rising young politician he
easily applied this critique to the George W. Bush administration. Later,
as president, Obama came to believe the most important foreign policy
decisions were about the careful calculation of risk and avoiding costly
interventions in places where US core interests were not at stake.
Clinton, by contrast, sees the military as a useful tool to be deployed
sometimes as a “force for good” when resolving tough foreign policy
dilemmas. Landler fully accepts that Hillary Clinton is a liberal interventionist, and her hawkish approach to foreign policy is not simply the
result of political expediency, though this factor can also play a role.
While her husband was president, Clinton believed “the only way to
stop genocide in Bosnia was through selective air strikes against Serbian
targets” (43). She also pressed her husband’s aides to help support
President Bill Clinton on the decision to go forward with punishment
air raids against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Operation Desert Fox (1998).
Many of her closest aides over the years have shared this outlook,
reinforcing and even prodding her to consider more interventionist
ideas. Clinton’s hard-edged views on the use of force have been noted
by critics throughout her career, including Senator Bernie Sanders and
Donald Trump.
As Secretary of State, Clinton was a forceful advocate for the US
intervention in Libya, although she was strongly opposed in this effort
by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Many of her critics defined this
position as a major blunder; however, at the time, Libya had a lot to
recommend it, including a manageable population of 6.6 million, important oil resources, and no virulent religious or ethnic divisions. Obama,
by contrast, was skeptical of the West’s power to shape events in Libya,
but was eventually persuaded by Clinton and others that the intervention would be easy and low cost. Later, as the post-Gaddafi Libyan order
descended into chaos, Gates came to believe, “They made exactly the
same mistake in Libya that they accused Bush of in Iraq, failure to plan
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for what comes after the bad guy is gone” (169). Clinton and especially
Obama were both haunted by the unravelling of Libya, however, Obama
also blamed himself for being talked into an intervention he had strongly
doubted from the beginning.
Looking elsewhere in the Middle East, Obama was skeptical about
deeper US involvement in the Syrian civil war and remained satisfied
with sending a trickle of weapons to Syrian rebels. Obama’s reluctance
to get more involved was also reinforced by the CIA’s “hard look” at the
record of providing weapons to insurgent fighters in previous conflicts,
which were mostly “miserable failures” (220). The notable short-term
exception to this disastrous record was the supply of weapons to Afghan
fighters during the Soviet–Afghan war. Under these circumstances, Syria
seemed like a bad bet to Obama.
Landler notes both Obama and Clinton maintained a strong interest
in Asia and sought to revive the US role there after long years where
the central focus of US foreign policy was the Middle East. Clinton
spearheaded the effort to focus greater interest on supporting Asian
allies, dubbing it the “pivot” (289). Her tough diplomacy with China
and heavy focus on Asia is described by Landler as “perhaps her greatest
contribution to Obama’s foreign policy, the one in where she indisputably made a mark” (289). Such policies included the sale of weapons to
Taiwan and a 35 percent tariff on China for dumping tires into America.
Clinton also told her subordinates to work more closely with Asian
states concerned about China and took offense at the Chinese belief the
United States was in a downward spiral and its representatives (including
President Obama) could be treated accordingly. Clinton further normalized relations with Myanmar, allowing its leaders to reduce reliance on
China which had turned their country into a vassal state. This initiative
was handled almost entirely through Clinton and her subordinates with
very little input from the White House.
Landler maintains that, as the Obama administration comes to
a close, the President views his two most significant foreign policy
accomplishments as the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program
and the diplomatic breakthrough with Cuba. He also contends Hillary
Clinton, as president, would not have sought a diplomatic solution to
the problems with Iran and would have been more open to a military
attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Nevertheless, Clinton was of
real use to Obama in putting together the program of multilateral sanctions designed to pressure Tehran into negotiations on surrendering its
nuclear weapons option. Landler suggests Clinton “set the table” for
the diplomatic agreement which was negotiated under the leadership
of Secretary of State John Kerry. In dealing with Tehran, she was the
“bad cop” while Obama was the “good cop” and both benefited from
this belief. The author also believes Obama and Clinton are now in a
“delicate succession dance” where they are seeking to help each other
for their own reasons (345). Obama realizes his legacy could be undone
by Trump’s presidency, and he considers the Iran deal and the climatechange pact to be vulnerable in such circumstances.
Additionally, the book includes a number of interesting points on
how the Washington foreign policy machine works. In selecting Clinton
as his first secretary of state, Obama recognized the danger of having
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an ambitious politician in this key cabinet role. Nonetheless, he also
saw significant advantages. In particular, he hoped Clinton’s stature as
an important public figure could help repair the US image and diplomatic setbacks he saw as a result of the eight years of George W. Bush’s
presidency. Clinton also saw advantages in working with Obama,
although her defeat in the 2008 presidential campaign left her with
some bitterness to overcome. In one memorable passage in the book,
the Brazilian president admitted to Clinton he had never expected
Barack Obama to become president. Her more than candid response
was, “Well, neither did I” (9).
In summary, Alter Egos is an important look inside the Obama and
Clinton formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This study
had special resonance during the election campaign between Clinton
and Trump, but is also important because the contrasting Obama and
Clinton views of foreign policy will continue to be reflected in upcoming
strategy debates.

The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s
Clandestine Service
By Henry A. Crumpton
Reviewed by Mark Grzegorzewski, Professor of Graduate Studies, Joint Special
Operations University

T

o the uninitiated, the intelligence world is full of skullduggery,
deceit, and loathsome behavior. Henry A. Crumpton, in The Art
of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, puts
a human face on this world while acknowledging the need for clandestine operatives in defense of the nation. Crumpton, a career CIA officer
and head of operations at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center during the
1990s, achieved legendary status for his work in thwarting the Millennium
Plot and for his actions in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Accordingly, he is the ideal contributor to a book on covert action.
The Art of Intelligence is a very readable book. Full of anecdotal accounts
of a CIA officer’s fulfilling career, it is more a memoir than an academic
analysis of the intelligence world and its applicability to policymakers.
With multiple references to Sun Tzu and a chapter on Crumpton’s time
with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, it
never transitions to a theoretical lens, and readers are left searching for
lessons learned by the US government in countering terrorism.
Among other things, the book describes Crumpton’s interagency
and counterterrorism career, including his liaison role with the FBI and
the institutional distrust between the FBI and the CIA, his involvement in developing armed drones and the resulting pushback from the
Department of Defense, and his time at the CIA’s Counterterrorism
Center. An important insight provided by Crumpton is much counterterrorism work goes unacknowledged because of the nature of the
business. Alternatively, the public only sees acts of terrorism that have
not been thwarted by the US intelligence community, rather than the
“presumably” many-more instances when terrorism has been foiled.
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Crumpton also vividly describes the US fight against terrorism
in Afghanistan. His accounts of working directly with Ahmad Shah
Massoud and Hamid Karzai are truly wonderful. Readers are left musing
what happened to Afghanistan? Crumpton’s answer is how the US government’s failure to plan for Afghan state-building and its premature
focus on Iraq contributed to disappointment in Afghanistan. This is a
persistent theme throughout the book—the failure of US policymakers,
not the failure of US intelligence operatives.
In addition, Crumpton discusses his role as the coordinator
for terrorism at the Department of State and attaining the rank of
ambassador-at-large, which gave him a brief outsider’s view of the
CIA before his retirement from government service in 2007. He also
highlights his work at Johns Hopkins, following his government service,
which put his CIA career in a theoretical context—something the
book is missing.
While Crumpton’s aim to show the nature of intelligence will
continue to grow as the nature of war continues to shift, especially
in the post-9/11 world, readers are left underwhelmed by his plethora
of anecdotal accounts which lack analysis. The book, a reflection of
his distinguished service coupled with a treatise on how the CIA is
underused, misused, or misunderstood, never details how to restructure
the organization to inform policymakers better.
Although Crumpton did not meet his stated goals, I would recommend The Art of Intelligence to veterans and newcomers for its interesting
firsthand accounts and its display of how actions taken by others, including policymakers and intelligence operatives, impact US national
security. The value of this book lies in the insight it provides into the
interlinked worlds of intelligence, policymaking, and warfare.
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New Theories in Security Studies
Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception
By Brian Massumi
Reviewed by Philip W. Reynolds, University of Hawaii-Manoa

B

rian Massumi’s latest addition to our understanding of power
may be the most important addition to strategy since On War. To
Massumi, an ontopower is power that is able to alter perception about a
chain of effects, altering the future of the original (41). It is, as its Greek
prefix would indicate, a living power. Massumi’s protagonist is the idea
of preemption as strategy, and he describes in his book the underlying
assumptions on which preemption becomes the only response available
to threats. Preemption, because it occurs before the threat emerges,
must have as its ontological premise the ability to define a threat after
its destruction has occurred. Preemption, in its truest sense, requires
perceptions bent to fit the action. In other words, what could be a threat
should be attacked because it could attack you. Preemption changes
premise from fact to potential.
What Massumi does very well is translate a philosophy of action
into epistemological methods. He uses the word “operationalization,”
familiar to military planners, to describe this process. This word means
“to make into an action.” True to its assumptions, ontopower requires
descriptions of the environmental system as full of threats. What may be
surprising to some, the two dominant descriptive paradigms of modern
life, neoconservatism and neoliberalism (43), synthesize a need for this
power, one that benefits from an ability to reorganize the complexity
of the environment. One militarizes the environment and the other
benefits from the creative destruction of the capitalist order. It is in this
way preemption, an ontology, becomes epistemology.
To Massumi, the juxtopostion of deterrence and preemption creates
a new era in security studies. Deterrence is policy; it is the rationalization
of competition between peers who are against unitary actors. Preemption
supposes there is no benefit for rationalizing. The Cold War was deterrence, but we have entered a new era where threats require responses
faster than policy can provide. Massumi makes the point, if our actions
create the enemy, then preemption only requires a threat because the
threat could become an enemy. But, preemption disturbs equilibriums.
It creates reactions that cannot be predicted, and uncertainty is a vague,
uneasy threat, and so on. One does not preempt something you can deter,
and you do not deter something that can be preempted. Preemption is
the logical conclusion of the liberal state’s inability to provide security,
what Massumi calls the “perception attack.”
Massumi’s explanation of the militarization of ontopower and the
machinations of history are his strengths. In joining the concepts that
drove the revolution in military affairs to the execution of the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, he reveals the transformation of mundane
military strategy into a power to the edge (93). Massumi’s connection
here of the unknowable threat and the preemptive actions reveal a
frightening world in which there are unanticipatory effects that create
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father actions, and so on. Capabilities-based operations provide a nexus
in which the terminus of action meets the push of past skill and reflex.
The role of command is one of modulating emergence in order that
the action provides the information required to perceive the threat.
Information becomes secondary even as the military relies ever more
on information technology (123).
This operationalization and militarization of preemption and
Massumi’s description of the role of threat is deeply concerning. Are
these assumptions conditioning the security-state to long for the “end of
action” that preemption seems to afford? A nation could convince itself
of the need to preempt a threat that is not really there, and trigger a war.
Massumi approaches the metaphysical with his “confounding aspect”
when he invokes Whitehead’s lament about the “unfortunate effect” of
“back cast critical thought” (155). There is no pure history from which
to learn, no exogenous right. What we know now affects what we knew
before. Something happens, and we immediately reconfigure the past
to fit the new information. Not doing this could create an unbearable
cognitive dissonance, but it is not a one-way street. The past has a
force all its own that affects the present and the future. Through
his writing, both here and previously, Massumi is issuing a clarion
call on the changing nature of power, with preemption becoming a
strange attractor bending past and present into a network of constantly
changing assumptions (209).
Ontopower is less a guidebook than a warning against assuming we
will be right. Without making a moral argument, Massumi effectively
describes the moral limitations of the power to preempt, the rewriting
of history through the actions of the present, and the confirmation of
what could have been into what was. This book should be studied by
practitioners of power—professionals who owe it to the country to have
discussions now, so as to have answers when policy demands action.

Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion
and Collapse
By Paul Staniland
Reviewed by Patrick Finnegan, Strategy and Security Institute, University of
Exeter, with Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics and
International Studies, University of Warwick
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aul Staniland’s Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion
and Collapse is an important contribution to the analysis of
terror networks and their motivations. The book compares the
organizational structure and strength of militant groups engaged in
violent conflict and examines the question of cohesion in terrorist
groups. This is necessary as, in Staniland’s words, “the ability of rebels to
build strong organizations has been crucial to their military effectiveness
and political influence.”
Staniland’s central argument is that the social solidarity and internal
hierarchy of terrorist organizations—their social cohesion—will
determine their political goals and tactics: “pre-war networks in which
insurgent leaders are embedded determine the nature of the organization
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they can build when a war begins.” By focusing on the social links surrounding the initial leadership of these groups, Staniland highlights how
social networks determine the development of the organization. He also
shows how this development, and later performance, at an organizational
level is dependent on the initial social structures of the founders. While
this does not explain performance at a ground level, it does show how
it may be possible to predict organizational development based upon
preexisting knowledge of the founders. This aspect of the book is well
suited for readers wishing to understand nonstate actor organizational
development, strengths, and weaknesses.
After an initial contextual discussion, readers are presented with a
series of case studies, exploring how each of the selected terror groups
originated and adapted to the changing situation. Conflicts reviewed
occurred in theaters in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. A fourth
case study is based in Southeast Asia. By utilizing ideas of path dependency, Staniland illustrates how these groups were, in many cases,
restricted in the potential forms they could take; shows the difficulty of
transition between one form and another; and highlights the impact of
destabilization tactics on particular groups.
Networks of Rebellion is an accessible work. It deals with a variety
of conflicts, many of which Staniland acknowledges as being underresearched, and presents clear, understandable explanations of each
organization under review. In the fifth chapter, for example, Staniland
presents organizations which may initially appear to share many similarities, but which can and will act differently based on subtle preconflict
differences. He uses the different paths followed by traditional clerics
and urban Islamists in pre-Taliban Afghanistan as an example.
Through detailed case studies, Staniland highlights the subtle differences between the groups, which in other studies might be discussed
collectively under particular titles such as “religious extremist”—or may
not be discussed at all if they are smaller or do not pose the largest
threat—and illustrates how subtle differences can have significant
implications. For instance, the difference between the links found in
revolutionary Islamists and traditional clerics, both religiously minded,
resulted in the clerics becoming “obsolete and unequipped to do political battle” compared to the Islamist group with its better connections
between leaders.
A negative issue with the book is its difficult position within current
cohesion literature. The title suggests the book explains how insurgent
groups operate and conduct their missions. This is not entirely true. This
is a work of organizational cohesion taken in its literal sense—bonding
links. Current cohesion literature focuses more on cohesion defined as
actual military practice—task cohesion. For readers seeking an understanding of the latter, they will need to look elsewhere.
That being said, one of the most redeeming features of the book is
how it is written. Staniland is honest about the strengths and limitations
of his research, and he does not claim to answer all of the questions
related to the chosen conflicts. He attempts to answer specific questions
by examining specific case studies. When the results differ from the
prediction, he is direct and clear about the limitations of this way of
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thinking. He is also aware of what the book contributes to the field, in
many ways substantially, and what it does not.
The closing chapter is the book’s most important. Staniland lays out
what his theory can and cannot explain. He presents recommendations
for future research and policy and opens the door for a wide range of
research activities that can build directly upon his work and focus on
the questions he omitted. One of the most important elements to take
away from Networks of Rebellion is that “conflict does not play out on a
blank slate that actors can make and remake as they wish. Instead, the
past shapes leaders’ options in the present.”
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Regional Studies: China and Japan
Middle Kingdom & Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese
Relations, Past and Present
By June Teufel Dreyer
Reviewed by Michael A. Spangler, Visiting Professor, Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

J

une Teufel Dreyer, a political science professor at the University of
Miami, offers readers a broad historical introduction to China-Japan
relations, but breaks no new ground to explain their power rivalry or
to assay their likely future directions. Dreyer begins with the first documented contact between the Chinese and Japanese in the late Han dynasty
and touches on their clashes on the Korean peninsula during the Tang
and Ming dynasties that bookend the failed Yuan dynasty invasions of
Japan in the thirteenth century. She then devotes most of her book to
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Japan occupied Taiwan,
Korea, Manchuria, and China’s eastern seaboard.
Dreyer’s chief strength lies in her detailed discussion, often drawing
on primary sources, of political groups in both countries that held conflicting opinions about trade, military strategy, and the growing role
of the United States in the region. She spotlights little-known facts
that flesh out readers’ understanding of Sino-Japanese relations—for
example, Dreyer cites often-insulting terms both sides applied to each
other during their turbulent history. She notes China’s declaration of war
against Japan in 1894 referred to its adversaries as “dwarf pirates,” while
in 2004 a Japanese Diet member called China “a Yamata-no-Orochi,”
that is, “a mythical eight-headed, eight-tailed dragon reputed to attack a
village each year to eat one of its female children.”
Dreyer argues Sino-Japanese clashes are “merely symptoms” of an
underlying problem, namely the unwillingness of either state to accept
the other as an equal or to accept a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the
other. She notes the Chinese have long regarded themselves as civilized
and all others (including Japan) as barbarians or inferiors. Japanese
nativists ridiculed this claim because barbarians had conquered China
and been recognized as its leaders several times. To these Japanese nativists, Japan was the true Middle Kingdom, especially after it adopted
Western-inspired industrial and military reforms that placed it on an
upward trajectory of national power. Dreyer argues the Japanese were
“psychologically prepared” to undergo these reforms because they had
borrowed “so heavily from China in the past.” What a back-handed
compliment to China and a put-down of Japan’s own cultural gifts for
self-criticism and improvement!
Arguably the most horrific episode in Sino-Japanese history was
Japan’s Nanjing Massacre in December 1937. Nanjing, then the capital
of the Republic of China, was devastated by the Imperial Japanese Army
reportedly killing 300,000 people, according to Chinese accounts. To this
day, Dreyer concludes, this campaign “remains . . . a massive impediment
to efforts at Sino-Japanese reconciliation.” In 1985 when Prime Minister
Yasuhiro Nakasone made his government’s first post-World War II visit
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to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, anti-Japanese
protests by students broke out in several Chinese cities. Prime Minister
Shinzō Abe’s visits to Yasukuni draw strong rebukes from China today.
In 1951, Japan and its World War II adversaries concluded treaties
that affirmed Japan’s sovereignty and ended Allied occupation. The
US-Japan treaty called for a continued US military presence in Japan
to strengthen regional security in East Asia where the Korean War had
broken out a year earlier. In China, however, Communist Party officials
viewed the US forces as a potential threat. Dreyer observes that the
Chinese began to see the US-Japan alliance as designed to “wage war
against China and the rest of Asia.” Dreyer could have added that many
Chinese opinion makers today frame the US policy of rebalancing to the
Asia-Pacific in similar terms. They fuel China’s encirclement anxieties by
claiming, inter alia, Japan and other neighbors are challenging China’s
maritime claims due to US support, Japan’s prime minister is moving to
reinterpret his country’s pacifist constitution with US acquiescence, and
the United States is shepherding a trans-Pacific trade deal that includes
Japan while excluding China.
China’s weakness throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries constitutes a historical outlier, not the norm of its history. By
reverting to its mean, China today may be enjoying a relatively stable
period during which it increasingly reasserts its influence as a major
world power. If this is true, it is not surprising Dreyer contends “the
intervals between Sino-Japanese confrontations have become shorter,
positions more intransigent, and the probability of reaching compromises progressively reduced.” The best we can hope for, Dreyer
suggests, is a carefully managed “uncomfortable peace.” No wonder she
ends Middle Kingdom & Empire of the Rising Sun with a Chinese proverb
she translates as “stones that cannot escape each other rub each other
smooth.” Clearly, she believes the grating Chinese and Japanese stones
will become smoother either through greater cooperation or violent
conflict. Readers are left to decide.
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Military History
Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of
Modern War
By Douglas Macgregor
Reviewed by COL Tarn Warren, Chair, Department of Military Strategy,
Planning, and Operations, US Army War College

U

sing the lens of history and five twentieth-century campaigns and
battles, Douglas Macgregor’s Margin of Victory: Five Battles that
Changed the Face of Modern War delivers an incisive account of the salient
reasons for success and failure in war and what the United States needs
to do to ensure its future margin of victory. Macgregor asserts that a
nation’s ability to adapt its military organization, technology, and human
capital to dominate enemies and threats will ensure its victory in the
critical first battles of future high-intensity conflict. He also warns that
the last 15 years of counterinsurgency and occupation duty has atrophied
the US military’s ability to succeed in this environment, particularly so for
the US Army.
Thematically linked, each chapter offers a unique historical
vignette—the battle of Mons in 1914, the battle of Shanghai in 1937,
the destruction of German army group center in the western Soviet
Union in 1944, the counterattack across the Suez Canal in 1973, and the
Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Although some of the
chapters support the author’s arguments better than others, their overall
message is clear: wars are often decided in the decades before they begin,
not by just-in-time technology, rushed task organization, or the
surprising impact of key leaders on the spot. The book concludes
with specific, well-considered reform recommendations for the US
Department of Defense.
An iron fist of a read, Margin of Victory is generally coherent and supported by ample and relevant evidence; however, Macgregor does not
always choose the best historical examples to support his main points,
and he sometimes strays into unsupported commentary on previous
national policy and unnecessary declaratives. Add to this Macgregor’s
affinity for high-intensity conventional warfare, and the balance of the
book suffers.
The book opens with a less-than-expected first example: the battle
of Mons. While Sir Richard Haldane’s reforms of the British army were
underway, they had little strategic impact on the Western front in the
fall of 1914. The narrative gains strength as it unfolds further in the
battle of Shanghai, where Japanese resistance to needed reforms and
the exorbitant price they paid in blood and material for courting hubris
exposed their failure to adapt their military organization, their poor use
of nascent armored forces, and their refusal to take advantage of the
synergy of jointness.
Patient readers are rewarded in the middle of the book. The 1944
collapse of German army group center and the 1973 Suez campaign
are towering examples of victory achieved through needed reforms and
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superb human capital. Macgregor adeptly lauds the seriousness and
impressive utility of Soviet interwar reforms, not only in technology, but
also in organization and doctrine. The Soviet use of mobile armored
and related forces with integrated air support conducting shock and
deep operations inside a unified general staff structure was nothing
short of revolutionary for a state that just two years before nearly faced
extinction. Equally impressive was the 1973 Israeli counterattack across
the Sinai Peninsula and Nile River, leveraging speed, surprise, and a
culture of mission command that rewarded small-unit initiative. Front
and center in these two examples, Macgregor makes his point clear: fast
and well-protected armored forces were vital to ensure a solid margin
of victory.
In the final example, Macgregor highlights the Battle of 73 Easting
during Operation Desert Storm. While this battle was wholly tactical
and not particularly decisive to the outcome of the campaign, Macgregor
shows why excessive caution and a lack of true jointness are threats to
victory and why aggressive leaders imbued with a culture of mission
command are needed at all levels.
But what about the types of modern, “wicked” problems that do
not lend themselves to solution by highly mobile armored forces with
joint fire support, yet remain vital to our national interests and need a
military response? The author gives foreign policy prescriptions that
dismiss many of these, and they weaken his arguments. The range of
military operations is well-established in US joint doctrine for a reason,
and we would be wise to remember that soldiers did not invent the
range; national policy did.
Macgregor concludes with innovative and powerful recommendations. First, the Department of Defense should create a national chief
of defense and staff with full operational and administrative authority.
Second, the geographic combatant commands and services should cash
in bloated and unnecessary layers of command, such as the service
components, and replace them with robust and agile regional joint task
forces. At a minimum, this would reduce decision cycles and improve
joint integration. Third, all services, but particularly the Army, need
organizations far less suitable for occupation and more capable for
decisive, mobile, and high-end joint combat. To be sure, Macgregor’s
repeated warnings about the need for decisive victory on short notice
against high-end symmetric threats are well founded and supported by
recent scholarship. But, this fact does not mean the United States should
neglect security cooperation, presence for assurance and deterrence, and
permanent alliances to achieve it. Our national interests demand a more
balanced approach.
Whether you agree with the author or not, Margin of Victory is a
worthy read with several well-considered recommendations that will
prompt critical thinking and debate among senior military leaders and
others in the defense community about how we fight—and what it might
take to win the next war.
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Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915
By Richard L. DiNardo
Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, Senior Historian, US Army Heritage and
Education Center

T

his book is a major contribution to understanding one of the lesserknown and under-studied campaigns of the First World War still
dominated by the Western Front. It is part of the publisher’s “War,
Technology, and History Series” whose editor highlights the challenge to
analyze “the precise role of technology.” This work is a case study from
the principal Central Powers’ perspective. The author has made extensive
use of German and Austrian sources.
The introduction articulates the book’s scope and context clearly
and succinctly. It juxtaposes this final invasion of Serbia with the Central
Powers’ previous, combined operation against Russia earlier in the year,
the stunning victory at Gorlice-Tarnów, which the author covered in
an earlier book in the same series. The latter was a high-water mark
of German and Austro-Hungarian cooperation, liberating Austrian
Galicia and conquering Russian Poland in May–July 1915. The invasion
of Serbia in September–November 1915 was the last for the “military
marriage” of August von Mackensen as commander and Hans von
Seeckt as his Chief of Staff.
The first chapter is a whirlwind review of nineteenth-century
European history, national developments, diplomacy, and conflicts. The
start of the twentieth century saw increasing German diplomatic isolation, but particularly Austrian fear of an expansionist Serbia as a mortal
threat. The chapter reviews the embarrassing Austro-Hungarian failures
to subdue Serbia in the latter half of 1914, emphatically stating Austrian
Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf should have comprehended
Austria-Hungary could only fight on one front at a time. The main effort
should have been Galicia against the Russians, not both simultaneously.
Chapter 2 considers strategic priorities and decisions in March–
September 1915. Turkish membership in the Central Powers from
October 1914 had raised the requirement to develop a landline of communications. Any future missions also had to account for the devastating
Austro-Hungarian defeat in the winter Carpathian Campaign against
Russia. Significantly, German Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn
established alliance strategic prioritization of a Serbian operation—
without consideration of civilian policymakers.
Chapter 3 covers plans and preparations, including assigned forces,
which composed a joint and combined campaign. Under command were
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops; aviation elements;
and the Austrian-Hungarian Navy’s Danube Flotilla. The text includes a
superb review of commanders, German and Austrian, down to division.
This cast of characters brought quality and experience to the conduct
of the operation.
Chapter 4 discusses the opening moves between September 25 and
October 12. Chapter 5 focuses on the decisive 10 days from October
12 to 22. Chapter 6 highlights the subsequent fall of key cities from
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October 22 to November 5. Chapter 7 summarizes the pursuit on
November 6 to 30. These chapters convey the continual challenge to
comprehend ground truth and to demonstrate flexibility to adapt and
retain initiative. Indeed, campaign success did not deliver the intent to
destroy the Serbian Army around Kosovo. Nonetheless, Mackensen’s
operation had achieved the defeat of Serbia and the establishment of a
line of communications for about 67,000 casualties.
Chapter 8 analyzes post-campaign considerations from December
1915 to January 1916, and Chapter 9 provides overall assessments.
Serbian remnants escaped to Adriatic ports, where Allied shipping
evacuated them. Reconstituted on Corfu, a new Serbian army would
fight out of Salonika. Worse, the defeat of Serbia marked the end of
the closest German and Austrian cooperation. As with the GorliceTarnów operation, the perennial spats between Falkenhayn and Conrad
had magnified difficulties. The final conquest of Serbia also exacerbated the less-than-harmonious relations between the German High
Command and the German operational headquarters on the Eastern
Front. German and Austrian strategic priorities increasingly diverged as
Austrian dependence on German military assistance increased.
The role of technology is integrated throughout the text. The Central
Powers leveraged several technical enablers. Specialists extracted the
maximum benefit from available rail lines. Army and aviation services had well-integrated aerial reconnaissance. Commanders fielded
a preponderant advantage in artillery overall— and heavy artillery in
particular. The Germans capitalized on signals and communications to
facilitate offensive operations, including frequent movement of higher
headquarters forward as necessary. Nonetheless, technology was not
a panacea; warfare still required careful planning, logistics, and sustainment. Skilled commanders and staff wielded them with seasoned
expertise; they did not own a monopoly. Admittedly, they fought an
outnumbered and war-weary foe.
Unfortunately, there are numerous errors in the text. The significant
quantity of editing oversights is difficult to comprehend. These do little
justice to the author’s efforts. One factual error is to categorize both the
German SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau as light cruisers; the former was
a battle cruiser.
Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 provides a thoroughly researched,
well-written case study in a mere 138 pages, not including endnotes, on
a joint and combined operation from a century ago. The analysis underlines the clashing perspectives of different headquarters’ echelons. One
of the more intriguing aspects of the book concerns the ready German
concession to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria of responsibility for postconflict occupation. That period is another story entirely.
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Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the
Road to Revolution
By David L. Preston
Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for
Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

R

eading terrain in relation to the adversary is often the key to tactical
victory. It also makes for the beginnings of a first-rate military
history, as David L. Preston demonstrates in his profound Braddock’s
Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution. Preston
paddled, hiked, and drove his way to an excellent analysis of the maneuver and decision-making of the French, Indians, British, and colonists
during this epic campaign in the 1755 American wilderness. His on-theground treatment of events renders this study the definitive work of the
first conventional British ground operation of the French and Indian
War, and as Preston shows, with wide-ranging implications for Europe
in the Seven Years’ War, and eventually, the American Revolutionary War.
Hesitant at first to purchase what I considered yet another treatment
of this infamous engagement, Preston’s excellent lecture at the Ohio
Country Conference convinced me to rethink my impression. I was more
than rewarded. Braddock’s Defeat is one of the most thorough military
history accounts of any topic, combining detailed strategic, operational,
and tactical examinations with the best of modern military history’s cultural considerations. In so doing, Preston revives Braddock’s reputation
as a sensible military man, sensitive to the need to cultivate indigenous
allies, while placating the infighting colonists. The Indians themselves
become the main agent of victory for the battle, acting in conjunction
with French officers and cadets in crushing the British flankers and
pouring deadly enfilading volleys into Braddock’s beleaguered column.
Preston’s uncovering of rare Indian voices in the record adds brilliantly to this analysis. Braddock’s defeat was a matter of initial Indian
success in an ambush, in a fashion similar to what I have discovered
occurred repeatedly in the Great Narragansett War (traditionally King
Philip’s War). An initial accurate volley into a European column negotiating difficult terrain by a large number of concealed Indians usually
led to a rapid and decisive Indian victory. Although it may have been
more useful in the section about the battle itself, the counterfactual allusion to how Braddock might have reacted tactically is a critical piece
of Preston’s analysis (315–316). Subsequent Indian fighters, like Henry
Bouquet, Robert Rogers, and “Mad” Anthony Wayne, employed such
tactics against Native Americans, perhaps making good Braddock’s supposed final words, “We shall better know how to deal with them another
time” (273). As with many commands unprepared for the enemy, there
was no next time for Braddock and many of his troops who were killed
in action and mutilated in accord with Indian cultural affinities in war.
Preston does not conclude with new consideration of Indian
material, but uncovers original French sources in Caen’s archives and
elsewhere which produced, among valuable maps, a hitherto unknown
account of the French battle plan. I once attended the lecture of a wellknown and popular Second World War historian, who, when asked
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about the German sources he had examined for his massive volumes,
replied he had not considered them. Wrong answer. Preston avoids this
one-sided pitfall of writing military history by examining both Native
and French sources. He also reveals American historians have usually
filtered the extant English primary sources on Braddock through an
American-Whiggish lens, distorting the British commander’s ability as a
field commander and effective purveyor of colonial-Indian policy.
Preston’s championing of irregular warfare in the “Consequences”
and “Epilogue” sections, however, establishes a sense of false dichotomy
between European “conventional” and American “irregular” warfare.
(He also sometimes conflates ranging and light infantry tactics, which
were not always identical.) The Western-Near Eastern tradition of light
infantry musketeers developed in earnest during the endemic warfare.
between the Ottoman Turks, particularly the Janissaries, and the Spanish
Habsburg’s light infantry in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean
theater. Gustavus Adolphus later employed light infantry effectively
during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). In the New World, John
Mason of Connecticut utilized light infantry and ranging tactics (some
of which he had experienced in the Thirty Years’ War) in the Pequot
War (1636–1637), as did later Connecticut leaders and Massachusetts’
Benjamin Church in the Great Narragansett War (1675–1676). Wayne
Lee in Barbarians and Brothers also details the circulation of irregular
military methods within the Anglosphere.
Preston should have given his audience the “Paul Harvey” by
detailing the other side of the story concerning conventional forces’
initial losses. For every Braddock’s defeat, there was a Quebec, for
every St. Clair’s debacle (Battle of Wabash), a Fallen Timbers, for every
Isandlwana (Anglo-Zulu War), a Battle of Ulundi. This treatment of
irregulars extends in the American case to George Washington (whose
excellent treatment in the book is noteworthy), who sought not to
build a perfect hybrid of conventional and irregular units, but rather
to utilize light infantry and irregular tactics in complementary fashion
for decisive conventional combat. This relationship does not apply in
the inverse, as the operations in Quebec (1759) and Yorktown (1781)
were both war-ending conventional campaigns. While David Hackett
Fischer (who wrote an editor’s note for Braddock’s Defeat) demonstrates in
Washington’s Crossing the utility of American light forces to set the stage for
conventional battle—the reverse remains untrue—conventional forces
do not usually set the stage for war-ending victories of irregular or
militia forces.
This book must be read by those interested in early American,
ancien régime European, or military history. Preston has crafted a truly
special and remarkable account.

